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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1982, voters in Cleveland, Ohio, approved a law requiring that city employees
reside in Cleveland.' Seeking to strip the city and every political subdivision of Ohio
of their power to enforce their residency requirements, the Ohio General Assembly
passed a ban on residency requirements for full-time employees, effective May 1,
2006.2 Starting almost immediately upon passage of the ban, police and firefighter
'CLEVELAND, OHIO, CITY CHARTER ch. 11, § 74(a) (1982). See also Karen Farkas, 3
Cities Sue Taft to Keep Residency Rules, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), May 2, 2006, at B3.
According to the Ohio Municipal League, there are 125 cities and 13 villages that have some
form of residency requirements in their Charters. Letter from John Mahoney, Deputy Dir.,
Ohio Mun. League to Members of the Senate State & Local Gov't & Veterans Affairs Comm.,
(Apr. 18, 2005) (on file with author), available at http://www.omlohio.org/PastLegSession
Issues/letteronresidencysb82126.htm. For example, many of Ohio's major cities, such as
Cleveland, Dayton and Toledo, require residency for nearly all city employees, while smaller
cities tend to require the city manager or city administrator to live in the city. Id. Also,
"[w]hen a residency requirement is described as broader than residency within the city, it is
usually marked as within five, eight or fifteen miles from a designated point at the historic
center of the city." Id.
2OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 9.481 (LexisNexis 2008).
(A) As used in this section:
(1) "Political subdivision" has the same meaning as in section 2743.01 of the Revised
Code.
(2) "Volunteer" means a person who is not paid for service or who is employed on
less than a permanent full-time basis.
(B)(1) Except as otherwise provided in division (B)(2) of this section, no political
subdivision shall require any of its employees, as a condition of employment, to reside in any
specific area of the state.
(2)(a) Division (B)(1) of this section does not apply to a volunteer.
(b) To ensure adequate response times by certain employees of political
subdivisions to emergencies or disasters while ensuring that those employees generally are
free to reside throughout the state, the electors of any political subdivision may file an
initiative petition to submit a local law to the electorate, or the legislative authority of the
political subdivision may adopt an ordinance or resolution, that requires any individual
employed by that political subdivision, as a condition of employment, to reside either in the
county where the political subdivision is located or in any adjacent county in this state. For the
purposes of this section, an initiative petition shall be filed and considered as provided in
sections 731.28 and 731.31 of the Revised Code, except that the fiscal officer of the political
subdivision shall take the actions prescribed for the auditor or clerk if the political subdivision
has no auditor or clerk, and except that references to a municipal corporation shall be
considered to be references to the applicable political subdivision.
[Vol. 56:71
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unions began filing lawsuits seeking an immediate end to their municipality's
residency requirement,3 and cities around Ohio began filing lawsuits against the state
seeking a declaration that the state's prohibition of residency requirements is void
under the Ohio Constitution.
The constitutional argument pits a municipality's power of home rule, that is, its
ability to create its own laws separate from those put forth by the state,5 against the
Ohio General Assembly's power to enact legislation for the "health, safety and
welfare of all employees . ".6.." When a law, such as the ban on residency
requirements, is purportedly passed for employee welfare, the first step is to
determine whether the law was properly enacted under the "employee welfare
provision" of the Ohio Constitution.' This provision grants the Ohio General
Assembly the broad power to establish minimum wages, regulate the hours of labor,
and, more vaguely, to pass laws "providing for the comfort, health, safety and
general welfare of all employees . *."..8 The provision contains a powerful
(C) Except as otherwise provided in division (B)(2) of this section, employees of political
subdivisions of this state have the right to reside any place they desire.
Id. (emphasis added).
3State ex rel. Beane v. City of Dayton, 862 N.E.2d 97, 100 (Ohio 2007); Am. Fed'n of
State, County & Mun. Employees Local #74 v. City of Warren, No. 2006CV01489 (C.P.
Trumbull Sept. 14, 2007); State ex rel. Cleveland Fire Fighters Ass'n Local 93 of the Int'l
Ass'n of Fire Fighters v. Jackson, No. 06-CV-590463, slip op. at 2 (C.P. Cuyahoga Feb. 27,
2007).
4City of Toledo v. State, No. C106-3235, slip op. at 1 (C.P. Lucas July 27, 2007), City of
Dayton v. State, No. 06-3507, slip op. at 5 (C.P. Montgomery June 6, 2007); City of Akron v.
State, No. CV 2006-05-2759, slip op. at 1 (C.P. Summit Mar. 30, 2007); City of Cleveland v.
State, No. 06-CV-590414, slip op. at 2 (C.P. Cuyahoga Feb. 23, 2007); City of Lima v. State,
No. CV2006-0518 (C.P. Allen Feb. 6, 2007).
5Two provisions of the Ohio Constitution confer home rule authority to municipalities.
"Municipalities shall have authority to exercise all powers of local self-government and to
adopt and enforce within their limits such local police, sanitary and other similar regulations,
as are not in conflict with general laws." OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, § 3. "Any municipality may
frame and adopt or amend a charter for its government and may, subject to the provisions of
section 3 of this article, exercise thereunder all powers of local self-government." Id. § 7.
6OHIO CONST. art. II, § 34.
7OH1O CONST. art. II, § 34. "Laws may be passed fixing and regulating the hours of labor,
establishing a minimum wage, and providing for the comfort, health, safety and general
welfare of all employes; and no other provision of the constitution shall impair or limit this
power." Id.
The U.S. Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of Ohio have held for the past twenty-
five years that "[tihere is no constitutional right to be employed by a municipality while
[residing] elsewhere." Buckley v. City of Cincinnati, 406 N.E.2d 1106, 1108 (Ohio 1980);
McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Serv. Comm'n, 424 U.S. 645 (1976). Thus, "[a] municipal
residency requirement is a 'condition of employment whose constitutionality is beyond
peradventure under both federal and Ohio law as a result of the decisions in McCarthy and
Buckley."' Appellants' Brief at 10, City of Cleveland v. State, No. CA-07-89486 (Ohio Ct.
App.-8th May 22, 2007) (quoting Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Dayton, No. C-3-89-
367, 1990 WL 1016521 at n.9 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 23, 1990)).
8OHIO CONST. art. II, § 34.
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supremacy clause: "[N]o other provision of the constitution shall impair or limit this
power."9 Due to this clause, it appears that any law entered into under another
section of the Constitution, such as a residency requirement passed pursuant to the
home rule provision, is likely to be struck down. Since the seminal decision in Rocky
River v. State Employment Relations Board ° ('Rocky River IV") in 1989, when the
employee welfare provision competes with home rule, the employee welfare
provision prevails, nullifying the local law."
When a law is not properly enacted under the employee welfare provision, or,
alternatively, does not pertain to employee welfare at all, and the local and state law
conflict, the courts will apply a "home rule analysis" to determine which law will
prevail. 2 A city's home rule powers are broad under the Ohio Constitution, as it
confers the ability to "exercise all powers of local self government" and "local
police, sanitary and other similar regulations, as are not in conflict with general
laws."' 3 The ability to exercise powers of local self-government is, however, limited
when the issue is of statewide concern.'
4
Both of these issues are pertinent when it comes to analyzing the constitutionality
of the state's ban on residency requirements. This Note focuses exclusively on
whether the state's action falls within the province of the employee welfare
provision, though courts analyzing the issue also address home rule.
This Note argues that the prohibition of residency requirements does not qualify
as legislation for the "comfort, health, safety and welfare of all employes" since the
law improperly attempts to control conditionsfor employment, rather than conditions
of employment, and that the Supreme Court of Ohio has previously, improperly
interpreted the employee welfare provision and should more narrowly construe, if
not reverse, its holding in Rocky River IV. Part II addresses residency requirements
in the city of Cleveland and describes the current litigation in which the city is
involved. Part III provides a background of the four Rocky River cases. Finally, Part
IV argues that Rocky River IV should be overturned because it improperly departed
from precedent and the original intent of the framers of the Ohio Constitution.
II. CHALLENGES TO CLEVELAND'S RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT
In Cleveland, voters approved a City Charter provision in 1982, requiring that all
city employees become "bona fide" residents of the city within six months of
91d.
10539 N.E.2d 103 (Ohio 1989).
"Id. at 119-20.
12See Vill. of Beachwood v. Bd. of Elections, 148 N.E.2d 921, 922-23 (Ohio 1958).
Other recent state legislation has sought to usurp Ohio municipalities' power of home rule,
suggesting a trend. See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2923.13 (LexisNexis 2008) (concealed
carry); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 1349.25-37 (LexisNexis 2008) (predatory lending). See also
Reginald Fields, Cities See Death Knell Ringing on 'Home Rule'; Local Laws Increasingly
Wiped Out for State Rules, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Dec. 4, 2006, at B 1.
13OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, § 7 (emphasis added).
14 Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. City of Painesville, 239 N.E.2d 75, 78 (Ohio 1968).
[Vol. 56:71
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employment and maintain residency for the duration of his or her employment. 5
Employees that do not comply with the charter face termination. 16 On January 18,
2006, approximately four months prior to enactment of the state's prohibition of
residency requirements, Cleveland Mayor Frank Jackson issued a press release
indicating that the city would continue to enforce its residency requirement,
regardless of the pending state law.' 7 On May 1, 2006, the day the state law went
into effect, Mayor Jackson issued another press release indicating that the city of
Cleveland had filed a lawsuit against the state of Ohio regarding the state's attempt
to nullify Cleveland's residency requirement. 8 The case was filed in the Court of
Common Pleas for Cuyahoga County and was quickly consolidated with a lawsuit
filed by the state of Ohio and the Cleveland Fire Fighters' Union against the city.'9
In its February 2007 decision, the court held that the employee welfare provision
"is the controlling constitutional provision, and conflicting local laws passed
pursuant to the city's home rule power ... must succumb to state law."2 ° The court
15CLEVELAND, OHIO, CITY CHARTER ch. 11, § 74(a) (2006). Residency requirements
vary, however, throughout Ohio, both in their terms and how they are enacted. For example,
while Cleveland requires "bona fide" residency of all city employees, id., Cincinnati requires
the city manager, police and fire chief, and other administrative managers to reside within the
city, but permits appointed officials to "maintain their primary place of residence" within the
county. CINCINNATI, OHIO, MUN. CODE ch. 308, § 308-83(a)-(b) (2008). See also sources cited
supra note 1.
16CLEVELAND, OHIO, CITY CHARTER ch. 11, § 74(b) (2006).
17Press Release, City of Cleveland, An Important Notice Concerning Cleveland's
Residency Requirement (Jan. 18, 2006) (on file with author). Mayor Frank Jackson continued
to enforce Cleveland's residency requirement, and by August 2007, four city of Cleveland
employees were fired living in suburban Cuyahoga County. Susan Vinella, Jackson Defies
New State Law, Fires Workers for Where They Live, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Aug. 9, 2007,
at Bl. The city law director indicated that the investigations into the employees began before
the new state law went into effect. Id.
1 SPress Release, City of Cleveland, City of Cleveland Files Lawsuit to Protect Home Rule
(May 1, 2006) (on file with author). The state law, sponsored by a Republican from Chester
Township, Ohio, located in a county adjacent to Cuyahoga County, passed with bipartisan
support. Fields, supra note 12.
19City of Cleveland v. State, No. 06-CV-590414, slip op. at 2 (C.P. Cuyahoga Feb. 23,
2007). Apart from its constitutional arguments, the city argued that upholding the state law
would do "irreparable financial harm" to the city due to employees seeking residency in
surrounding communities. Id. at 9. The court rejected this argument by dismissing such
predictions as speculations and instead suggested that Cleveland "may employ its considerable
resources to entice its employees to live in the [c]ity by any lawful incentives available in the
same manner the [c]ity uses to attract businesses, tourists and other sources of revenue.
Clearly, requiring residency as a qualification of employment guarantees captive employee
taxpayers, but does not guarantee the efficacy of the workforce." Id. at 9-10.
Prospective candidates for Cleveland City Council from the city's West Park
neighborhood both indicated that tax incentives, either for housing or private schooling, would
probably be required to keep city workers living inside the city. Susan Vinella, Candidates
Present Ideas for West Park, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), July 2, 2007, at B2.
2 0City of Cleveland v. State, No. 06-CV-590414, slip op. at 10 (C.P. Cuyahoga Feb. 23,
2007).
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found that the state law was properly enacted pursuant to the employee welfare
provision,' but that even if it was not, the local law could not withstand home rule
analysis since the prohibition of residency requirements is a "law of statewide
concern that impacts the general welfare of working people." 2 The court pointed to
language within the statute itself: "The General Assembly finds, in enacting [the
prohibition of residency requirements] ... that it is a matter of statewide concern to
generally allow the employees of Ohio's political subdivisions to choose where to
live ... , "3 The city of Cleveland appealed to the Eighth District Court of Appeals. 4
Results from other county trial courts have been consistent. Every Ohio trial
court that heard challenges to residency requirements upheld the state law and found
the employee welfare provision controlling.2" However, Ohio appellate courts have
been upholding local residency requirements, including Cleveland's requirement. 6
In late 2008, the issue will be heard before the Supreme Court of Ohio in the case
involving the city of Akron's residency requirement.27 At that time, the court will
first have to address its holdings in a string of cases from the 1980s, Rocky River v.
State Employment Relations Board.8
211d. at 7 ("[T]he law provides these employees the freedom to reside in a location that is
in the best interest of their families and falls squarely within the authority granted to the
General Assembly under [the employee welfare provision].").
'21d. at 6.
231d. (quoting OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 9.481 (LexisNexis 2008)).
24City of Cleveland v. State, 8th Dist. Nos. 89486, 89565, 2008-Ohio-2655, 4.
25Am. Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees Local #74 v. City of Warren, No.
2006CV01489 (C.P. Trumbull Sept. 14, 2007), City of Toledo v. State, No. C106-3235, slip
op. at 2 (C.P. Lucas July 27, 2007); City of Dayton v. State, No. 06-3507, slip op. at 19 (C.P.
Montgomery June 6, 2007); City of Akron v. State, No. CV 2006-05-2759, slip op. at 6 (C.P.
Summit Mar. 30, 2007); City of Cleveland v. State, Nos. 590414, 06-CV-590463, slip op. at
10 (C.P. Cuyahoga Feb. 23, 2007); Lima v. State, No. CV2006-0518 (C.P. Allen Feb. 6,
2007).
2 6State v. City of Akron, 9th Dist. No. 23660, 2008-Ohio-38, 34; City of Lima v. State,
3d Dist. No. 1-07-21, 2007-Ohio-6419, 90; City of Toledo v. State, 6th Dist. No. L-07-1261,
2008-Ohio-1957, 23; City of Cleveland v. State, 8th Dist. Nos. 89486, 89565, 2008-Ohio-
2655, 52. The holding of City of Cleveland v. State relies heavily on the decisions of the
Third and Ninth District Courts of Appeal, which were decided several months earlier and are
discussed infra Part IV.A.2.c. One appellate court did rule in favor of the statewide ban. See
City of Dayton v. State, 2d Dist. No. 22221, 2008-Ohio-2589.
279th Dist. No. 23660, 2008-Ohio-38. The city of Cleveland, however, missed the filing
deadline for submitting briefs and will not be able to argue in favor of residency requirements.
Gabriel Baird, Cleveland Missed Deadline to Join Fight on City Residency Laws, PLAIN
DEALER (Cleveland), Sept. 24, 2008, available at http://blog.cleveland.com/metro/2008/09/
clevelandmisseddeadline toj.html.
28530 N.E.2d I (Ohio 1988); 533 N.E.2d 270 (Ohio 1988); 535 N.E.2d 657 (Ohio 1989);
539 N.E.2d 103 (Ohio 1989).
[Vol. 56:71
HeinOnline  -- 56 Clev. St. L. Rev.  714 2008
7
Sweet: Ohio's Ban on Municipal Residency Requirements: Can the Employee
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2008
2008] OHIO'S BAN ON MUNICIPAL RESIDENCYREQUIREMENTS 715
III. ROCKY RIVER v. STATE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD BACKGROUND
The four Rocky River cases are a group of important, politically charged
decisions that broadly define what is meant by "employee welfare" and further,
determine the supremacy of the employee welfare provision over home rule. This
Note only argues that Rocky River IV merits overturning.
A. Rocky River I9
In 1983, the Ohio General Assembly approved the Ohio Public Employees'
Collective Bargaining Act, which established the procedures for the representation of
public employees by labor unions.30 Among other things, the Act provided for
binding arbitration for the disputes arising between the municipal employee and the
municipal employer.3 Contrary to this law, the city of Rocky River in Ohio had
enacted a city charter, which provided that the city council "shall have the power to
fix the salaries of its members and all other officers and employees of the [c]ity. ' 32
Rocky River contested the constitutionality of the binding arbitration provision of the
Collective Bargaining Act, arguing that it is "a violation of its powers of local self-
government, usurping its power to set the wages of its safety forces. '33 The State
Employment Relations Board ("SERB") argued that the Collective Bargaining Act
was enacted pursuant to the employee welfare provision of the Constitution, and, "as
such, is a general law applicable to municipalities, notwithstanding [home rule]. 34
The Court of Common Pleas for Cuyahoga County declared the Collective
Bargaining Act constitutional,35 and the Eighth District Court of Appeals affirmed.36
The Supreme Court of Ohio first decided the case in 1988 on a motion to certify
the record.37 The court addressed the conflict between Rocky River's law and the
Collective Bargaining Act by conducting a home rule analysis. This analysis
29City of Rocky River v. State Employment Relations Bd. (Rocky River 1), 530 N.E.2d 1
(Ohio 1988).
30OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 4117.14(I) (LexisNexis 2008).
31§ 4117.14(C)(1)(a)-(c). The Collective Bargaining Act is quite comprehensive. Among
other things, it spells out what kinds of matters are subject to collective bargaining, § 4117.08,
the requirements of what needs to be included in a required written agreement, § 4117.09, and
defines unfair labor practice, § 4117.11.
32Rocky River 1, 530 N.E.2d at 6 (quoting ROCKY RIVER CHARTER art. 3, § 11 (1988)).
33 d at 3. The city also argued that this provision of the Collective Bargaining Act was
an unlawful delegation of authority. Id. at 6. Unlawful delegation cases arise where the
"delegation of power to make law ... necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be."
Id. (citing Cincinnati, Wilmington & Zanesville R.R. v. Comm'rs of Clinton County, 1 Ohio
St. 77, 88 (1852)). This issue is not discussed in this Note.
34Rocy River I, 530 N.E.2d at 3.
35City of Rocky River v. State Employment Relations Bd., No. CV-85-086753 (C.P.
Cuyahoga Nov. 12, 1985).
36City of Rocky River v. State Employment Relations Bd., No. CA-87-51299 (Ohio Ct.
App.-8th Nov. 20, 1986).
37Rocky River 1, 530 N.E.2d at 2.
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entailed looking into the two home rule provisions in the Constitution: one
authorizing municipalities to "exercise all powers of local self-government[,]"
among other things, 8 and the other permitting the adoption of a charter, under which
those powers could also be exercised. a9 The court asserted that "powers of local self-
government" are not limited if in conflict with a general law, such as the Collective
Bargaining Act,4° but a local law may otherwise be set aside if it touches a matter of
statewide concern.4  Despite the fact that the Collective Bargaining Law was
enacted to address a statewide concern, "promot[ing] labor peace in the public
bargaining sector," the court determined that Rocky River's collective bargaining
process does not concern residents outside of Rocky River and thus, is within the
power of local self-government.42
The court rejected SERB's contention that the employee welfare provision
prevents Rocky River's charter provisions from impairing the Collective Bargaining
Act.43 Looking at the prior opinions of the Supreme Court of Ohio, the court
determined that the employee welfare provision had generally only applied in cases
involving hours and minimum wages.' Further, the employee welfare provision
"has apparently never been argued, and certainly never been used, as a basis upon
which to declare that the authority of a municipality to bargain with its employees is
not an element of its home-rule powers."'' 5
Most importantly, the court distinguished its ruling in State ex rel. Board of
Trustees of Pension Fund v. Board of Trustees of Relief Fund ("Pension Fund"),46
which determined that the non-charter city of Martins Ferry was required to transfer
the assets of its pension fund to the state pension fund pursuant to state law enacted
under the employee welfare provision.47 While noting that the centralized, solvent
38Id. at 3 (quoting OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, § 3). In full, this provision says,
"Municipalities shall have authority to exercise all powers of local self-government and to
adopt and enforce within their limits such local police, sanitary and other similar regulations,
as are not in conflict with general laws." Id.
391d. (citing OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, § 7). In full, this provision says, "Any municipality
may frame and adopt or amend a charter for its government and may, subject to the provision
of section 3 of this article, exercise thereunder all powers of local self-government." Id.
4°Rocky River I, 530 N.E.2d at 4 (citing Novak v. Perk, 413 N.E.2d 784, 786 (Ohio
1980)).
41Id. at 5. "If the result affects only the municipality itself, with no extraterritorial effects,
the subject is clearly within the power of local self-government and is a matter for the
determination of the municipality. However, if the result is not so confined it becomes a
matter for the General Assembly." Id. (quoting Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. City of
Painesville, 239 N.E.2d 75, 78 (Ohio 1968)).




46233 N.E.2d 135 (Ohio 1967).
47Rocky River 1, 530 N.E.2d at 10 (citing State ex rel. Bd. of Trs. of Pension Fund v. Bd.
of Trs. of Relief Fund, 233 N.E.2d 135 (Ohio 1967)).
[Vol. 56:71
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pension fund system created in Pension Fund was clearly within the state's interest,
a similar state interest, as had been discussed under home rule analysis, could not be
found in Rocky River L48 The court reversed the Eighth District Court of Appeals
and entered final judgment in favor of Rocky River.4 9
Politically, this decision came down on November 2, 1988, with the justices split
4-3.0 The majority consisted of Chief Justice Thomas J. Moyer and Justices Ralph
S. Locher, Robert E. Holmes, and Craig Wright." At the time of the decision,
judicial elections were six days away, and Justice Locher could not run for re-
election due to imposed age limits on candidacy for the Supreme Court of Ohio.52
Democrat Alice Robie-Resnick won the election for Justice Locher's seat on
November 8," thus shifting the politics of the court.5 4 The holding in Rocky River I
was praised in the media for being "persuasive" and criticized for "reopen[ing] the
delicate balance of strike tradeoffs. '5
B. Rocky River I156
SERB requested both reconsideration and rehearing of the issues already raised
in Rocky River I, as well as clarification as to whether Rocky River I declared
unconstitutional the enforcement of grievance arbitration awards as provided for by
the Collective Bargaining Act.57 The same majority of justices as in Rocky River I
clarified that, since the enforcement of the arbitration awards was not raised nor
considered in Rocky River I, it was not ruled unconstitutional. The same justices,
however, denied the motion for reconsideration of the other issues, since SERB
481d. at 11 ("The 'interest' that produced the statewide pension fund held to be
constitutional in [Pension Fund] simply cannot produce a constitutional basis for replacing a
city's authority to set wages and benefits with an unelected, unaccountable arbitrator.").
491d. at 12.
01d. at 1.
511d. The Cleveland Plain Dealer reported that president of the Ohio AFL-CIO at the
time, John R. Hodges, "said the [Rocky River 1] decision was part of an assault on public
workers sought by 'the big business, anti-labor forces' that, Hodges claimed unseated
Celebrezze and elected Chief Justice Thomas J. Moyer, a Columbus Republican." Thomas
Suddes, High Court Upholds Most of Labor Law, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Nov. 3, 1988, at
B1.
522 Women Running for Locher Seat on Supreme Court, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Feb.
19, 1988, at B5. Nobody over 70 is eligible to run. OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 6.
531988 Ohio General Election Results, http://www.sos.state.oh.us/sos/ElectionsVoter/
results 1 980s.aspx?Section=452 (last visited Feb. 12, 2008).
54 James T. O'Reilly, More Magic with Less Smoke: A Ten Year Retrospective on Ohio's
Collective Bargaining Law, 19 U. DAYTON L. REv. 1, 8 (1993).
55 d.
56City of Rocky River v. State Employment Relations Bd. (Rocky River I1), 533 N.E.2d
270 (Ohio 1988).
57Id. at 271. According to the court, "That issue was not raised, was not considered, and
was not decided in the majority opinion." Id.
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"raised no germane arguments that were not considered by the court in the
disposition [of Rocky River 1]."'s
Politically, SERB's motion for reconsideration and rehearing came six days after
Justice Robie-Resnick's election, but she was not yet on the court. 9 The same
majority as in Rocky River I denied SERB's motion, while the same dissenting
justices, Justices A. William Sweeney, Andy Douglas and Herbert R. Brown, would
have granted a rehearing of all issues.'
C. Rocky River 11161
Twelve days later, SERB moved for reconsideration of Rocky River H's denial of
rehearing and reconsideration.62 In those twelve days, Justice Ralph Locher, who
sided against SERB in Rocky River I and II, retired from office and new justice,
Alice Robie-Resnick, was sworn in.63 Newly constituted, the court granted the
motion as to "all issues in this cause" brought up in Rocky River I and H.' In his
concurring opinion, Justice Herbert R. Brown supported the court's decision to grant
a second motion of reconsideration, though the court had denied similar motions in
the past.65 Addressing Justice Robert E. Holmes' dissent, which accused SERB of
"forum shopping" for waiting to file the motion for reconsideration "to obtain a
judgment from this court as newly constituted[,] 6 6 Justice Brown defended his
position to allow the rehearing by listing fifteen instances where the members of the
5Id. at 271-72.
591d. at 270.
6°Rocky River 11, 533 N.E.2d at 270. Douglas said that eliminating mandatory arbitration
without giving police officers the right to strike "is like having Christianity without the threat
of hell. There is no day of reckoning!" Suddes, supra note 51.
61City of Rocky River v. State Employment Relations Bd. (Rocky River III), 535 N.E.2d
657 (Ohio 1989). The justices "affectionately" dubbed the case "Rocky III." Andrew Douglas,
Public Sector Employee Bargaining: Contract Negotiations and Case Law, 55 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 1, 8 (2007).
62Rocky River 111, 535 N.E.2d at 657 (Brown, J., concurring).
63Mary Beth Lane, High Court to Rehear Rocky River Labor Case, PLAIN DEALER
(Cleveland), Feb. 11, 1989, at Al.
64Rocky River III, 535 N.E.2d at 657.
651d. at 658 (Brown, J., concurring). This is part of the basis for the appearance of
impropriety.
661d. at 662 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 56:71
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1987 court voted to rehear decisions made by the 1986 court.67 None of them,
however, were motions to reconsider a denied motion to reconsider.68
Politically, this motion for reconsideration of a denied motion for reconsideration
came just one day after Justice Resnick took office in January 1989.69 Upon her
arrival (and Justice Locher's departure), the minority in Rocky River I and I became
the majority and granted SERB a full rehearing on all of the issues already disposed
of in Rocky River J.70 Later that year, more fuel was added to the political fire as the
1989 court granted reconsideration of another case decided by the 1988 court.7'
67Id. at 658-59 (Brown, J., concurring). Of Justice Brown's examples, those with
published opinions reversing on the merits include Anilas, Inc. v. Kern, 509 N.E.2d 1267
(Ohio 1987), rev'g 502 N.E.2d 1025 (Ohio 1986), Office of Consumer's Counsel v. Public
Utilities Commission of Ohio, 513 N.E.2d 243 (Ohio 1987) and New Energy Co. of Indiana v.
Limbach, 513 N.E.2d 258 (Ohio 1987), rev'd, 486 U.S. 269 (1988).
"The dissent in Rocky River III distinguishes the cases cited supra note 67 on the
grounds that none of them were motions to reconsider a denial of a motion for rehearing.
Rocky River IlI, 535 N.E.2d at 659-60 (Moyer, C.J., dissenting).
69The Supreme Court of Ohio, Former Judges and Justices of the Supreme Court of Ohio,
http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/introduction/alljustices/default.asp (last visited Feb. 12, 2008);
Rocky River II, 535 N.E.2d at 657.
7
°Rocky River II, 535 N.E.2d at 657. Almost twenty years after the Rocky River
decisions, Justice Douglas discussed the changes in the court at that time, as well as his
motives in Rocky River III and IV:
Between the time Kettering was decided by the Court in 1986-totally upholding the
collective bargaining law-and Rocky River arrived in 1988, there had been an
election. At the 1986 election, Chief Justice Celebrezze was replaced by Chief Justice
Moyer. Now (instead of me having 4 votes) Justices Locher, Holmes and Wright had
their fourth vote, and after a very heated internal battle, this Court majority held that
the conciliation section was unconstitutional. Clearly it was the prelude for the whole
act to be found unconstitutional in the next cases to come. Notwithstanding the
Court's prior law, this, many of us believed, was the beginning of the end of the
Collective Bargaining Law. Then another interesting thing happened. Again it was an
election. In 1988, Justice Locher retired, and Justice Resnick was elected to replace
him. Through a number of procedural maneuverings, and I plead guilty to being the
mover, we kept the Rocky River case alive so that 'Rocky River I' was then followed
by 'Rocky River II' and then . . . 'Rocky [River] Ill.' Early in 1989, just after Justice
Resnick arrived, we reconsidered or reheard Rocky River I, and I wrote what is now
known as 'Rocky River IV.' The holding was intentionally made broad because I
wanted no mistakes this time.
Douglas, supra note 6 1, at 8-9 (footnotes omitted). At the original arguments for Rocky River
I, Douglas was described as "the most talkative of the justices." Mary Beth Lane, Challenges
to State Bargaining Law Heard, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), March 9, 1988, at B2. Douglas
made comments during the hearing that illustrated his labor views: "Collective-bargaining
rights are essential to employees' welfare. It's hard to think of what could be more
important." Id.
71Johnson v. Ohio Bureau of Employment Servs., 549 N.E.2d 153 (Ohio 1990), rev'g 533
N.E.2d 757 (Ohio 1988). As noted in the dissent,
This case had [already] been determined by the prior majority of this court in the
opinion and judgment issued December 30, 1988. The only change in circumstances
in this case was the composition of the court. No new public policy considerations
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D. Rocky River IV72
1. The Decision Not to Defer to Rocky River I
Justice Andy Douglas' opinion in Rocky River IV opened with a long dissertation
on stare decisis,7 determining that, for at least three reasons, the court should not
follow precedent in Rocky River IV. 74 First, the court determined that, if stare decisis
would be determinative at all, it should be to the extent that Rocky River I should
have relied on Pension Fund and other cases that "long ago settled the home-rule
amendment argument pitting Sections 3 and 7, Article XVIII versus [the employee
welfare provisionof the Ohio Constitution] . . . ,7' The court concluded, "[i]f the
doctrine of [stare decisis] applies [here], it should have been followed in Rocky
[River] I it cannot apply in Rocky [River] IV." 76  Second, because stare decisis
applies only to future cases, the court concluded that it would not consider Rocky
River I as having any precedential weight on Rocky River IV since they are "the same
case[.]"'77 Finally, since Rocky River IV involved the interpretation of the Ohio
Constitution, "the doctrine of [stare decisis] is less important in the constitutional
context than in cases of either pure judge-made law or statutory interpretation.
Therefore, each justice in Rocky River IV swore "to support and defend the
were presented for the majority's determination upon this matter. Consequently, there
was no need to disturb our prior holding.
Id. at 156 (Holmes, J., dissenting). The similarities between this case and Rocky River IV are
striking: both cases were originally decided after the 1988 Supreme Court of Ohio election but
before the new justice took office, both 1988 cases had same four justices sitting in the
majority, neither 1988 case sided with labor, motions for reconsideration were filed after the
new justice took office, the new majority granted reconsideration, and subsequently ruled for
labor. See id.; Rocky River IV, 539 N.E.2d 103 (Ohio 1989).
72Rocky River IV, 539 N.E.2d at 103.
73
"The doctrine of precedent, under which it is necessary for a court to follow earlier
judicial decisions when the same points arise again in litigation." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1443 (8th ed. 2004).
74Rocky River IV, 539 N.E.2d at 106-11.
751d. at 107.
761d.
77Id. In its final remark on stare decisis, the court further indicated that it would not
adhere to court precedent "because Rocky River involves the interpretation of the Ohio
Constitution by the current members of this court." Id. at 111.
78Rocky River IV, 539 N.E.2d at 108. The court quoted Justice Brandeis considerably on
the issue of stare decisis. He wrote, "[I]n cases involving the Federal Constitution, where
correction through legislative action is practically impossible, this Court has often overruled
its earlier decisions. The Court bows to the lessons of experience and the force of better
reasoning, recognizing that the process of trial and error, so fruitful in the physical sciences, is
appropriate also in the judicial function." Id. at 107 (quoting Bumet v. Coronado Oil & Gas,
Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406-08 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
[Vol. 56:71
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Constitution-not as someone else has interpreted it but as the judge deciding the
case at bar interprets it.
' 79
After determining it was not bound to follow the precedent established in Rocky
River I or in previous cases interpreting the same provisions of the Constitution, the
court emphasized that legislative enactments, such as the Collective Bargaining Act,
are presumed constitutional and that "presumption can only be overcome by proof,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the legislation and the Constitution are clearly
incompatible."8
2. The Home Rule Conflict
In addressing Rocky River's argument that the Collective Bargaining Act
violated Rocky River's home rule authority, the court interpreted the home rule
provisions of the Constitution to limit a municipality's exercise of any home rule
powers to those not in conflict with general laws.8  Though this departed
significantly from prior home rule cases that found powers of local self-government
were not limited even if in conflict with general laws, the court distinguished those
cases from Rocky River as not addressing home rule in the context of the employee
welfare provision.82
3. The Broad Interpretation of the Employee Welfare Provision
Having already disposed of Rocky River's case by holding that the Collective
Bargaining Act constitutionally usurped its home rule authority, the court went on to
interpret the employee welfare provision of the Ohio Constitution. The court held,
[The employee welfare provision] constitutes a broad grant of authority to
the legislature to provide for the welfare of all working persons, including
791d. at 108. The discussion of stare decisis in Rocky River IV came three years before the
U.S. Supreme Court decided Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania. v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833, 854-55 (1992), in which the Court expressed a similar approach to precedent on
constitutional issues.
80Rocky River IV, 539 N.E.2d at Ill (citing State ex rel. Dickman v. Defenbacher, 128
N.E.2d 59 (Ohio 1955)).
811d. at 113. As discussed in Rocky River I, the Supreme Court of Ohio had previously
interpreted the home provision to allow a municipality to wield all powers of local self-
government, limiting only "local police, sanitary, and other ... regulations" to those "not in
conflict with general laws." City of Rocky River v. State Employment Relations Bd. (Rocky
River 1), 530 N.E.2d 1, 3 (Ohio 1988). In Rocky River IV, however, the court examined parts
of the 1912 Constitutional Convention proceedings and determined that the Canada court was
wrong to distinguish the limits on the various types of home rule powers. Rocky River IV, 539
N.E.2d at 113. Though the court appeared to abolish the distinction between the limits of
local self-government powers and police powers, future cases did not follow suit. See Am.
Fin. Servs. Ass'n v. Cleveland, 858 N.E.2d 776, 781 (Ohio 2006); City of Canton v. State, 766
N.E.2d 963, 970 (Ohio 2002); Springfield Command Officers Ass'n v. City Comm'rs, 575
N.E.2d 499, 502-03 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990).
82Rocky River IV, 539 N.E.2d at 113 (noting that State ex rel. Canada v. Phillips, 151
N.E.2d 722 (Ohio 1958), is not apt precedent because it was "a case involving civil service ...
[and,][i]t does not deal in any way with [the employee welfare provision], which is so central
to the case before us today").
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local safety forces .... The provision expressly states in 'clear, certain,
and unambiguous language' that no other provision of the Constitution
may impair the legislature's power under Section 34. This prohibition, of
course, includes the 'home rule' provision contained in Section 3, Article
XVIII.83
The court said that the Collective Bargaining Act was "indisputably concerned
with the 'general welfare' of employees [and therefore,] pursuant to [the employee
welfare provision] may not be affected in any way by the 'home rule' amendment.""
Though the city of Rocky River argued that the employee welfare provision should
apply only to minimum wage, the court rejected this argument." Instead, the Rocky
River IV majority said that the fact that the majority of the constitutional debate was
devoted to minimum wage merely meant that it was the "only part of the proposed
amendment to which any delegates took serious exception." 6 The court outlined the
hearings of the constitutional convention, pointing to language that suggested that
more than minimum wage was contemplated.87
After combing through the hearings, the court indicated that "[t]he language of
[the employee welfare provision] is so clear and unequivocal that resort to secondary
sources, such as the constitutional debates, is actually unnecessary. Where the
language of a statute or constitutional provision is clear and unambiguous, it is the
duty of courts to enforce the provision as written."88 If the court were to determine
that the employee welfare provision only applied to minimum wage, "almost half of
the forty-one words ... must be regarded as mere surplusage ....
831d. at 114 (internal citations omitted).





871d. at 114-15. For example, the court noted that the employee welfare provision was
originally introduced as a proposal "[r]elative to the employment of women, children and
persons engaged in hazardous employment." Id. at 114 (quoting 1 PROCEEDINGS AND
DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF OHIO 106 (1912)). Also, the
court included a portion of Judge Dennis Dwyer's statements, which urged, beyond simply
minimum wage, that the delegates to "give your employees . . . good sanitary surroundings
during hours of labor, protection as far as possible against danger, a fair working day. Make
his life as pleasant for him as you can consistent with his employment." Id. at 115 (quoting 2
PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF OHIO
1332-33 (1912)).
88Rocky River IV, 539 N.E.2d at 115 (citing Bemardini v. Bd. of Educ., 387 N.E.2d 1222
(Ohio 1979)). The court added, "[I]f the provision is clear and may be read without
interpretation, the discussion leading to its adoption is of no value, nor are the various
statements by the members of the convention and the resolutions offered during the
convention determinative of the meaning of the amendment." Id. at 116 (citing State ex rel.
Harbage v. Ferguson, 36 N.E.2d 500 (Ohio 1941), appeal dismissed, 37 N.E.2d 544 (Ohio
1941)).
89Rocky River IV, 539 N.E.2d at 116.
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Unlike the majority in Rocky River I, the Rocky River IV majority embraced and
followed the Pension Fund case.9" The court emphasized that Pension Fund was
particularly applicable because the contested state law "creat[ing] a state-controlled
disability and pension fund [system]" was similarly attacked for violating home
rule.9' Further, the pension fund law was "considerably more intrusive on a
municipality's power of home rule than the [Collective Bargaining Act]" since it
mandated that cities pledge to transfer pension funds in an amount determined by the
state board into the state pension system for the next sixty years.9" The less-intrusive
Collective Bargaining Act, on the other hand, only required binding arbitration, and
therefore should face less scrutiny.93 The court also took note of the city of Rocky
River's criticism of Pension Fund, which characterized its "rarely cited" two and
one-half page opinion on the employee welfare provision and home rule as an
"aberration" and "wholly unnecessary because there was no home rule issue facing
the court." 4 In response, the court compared its "knowledge of the fine legal minds"
that decided Pension Fund with the interests of the city of Rocky River in the
outcome in the case.95 "[I]t is not difficult to determine where objectivity concerning
the issues and holding of Pension Fund would most likely lie. In any such contest,
[Rocky River] loses hands down."96
The court's decision to hold the Collective Bargaining Act constitutional based
on "the General Assembly's authority to enact employee welfare legislation pursuant
to [Section 34, Article II of the Ohio Constitution]" and render "[Section 3, Article
XVIII of the Ohio Constitution], the home-rule provision, [unable to] be interposed
to impair, limit or negate the Act[,]" vacated Rocky River I and Rocky River II, as
well as another case decided in the midst of the Rocky River cases.97
901d. The court further noted that Pension Fund was decided unanimously. Id. at 117.
911d at 116.
92Id. at 116-17.
93Rocky River IV, 539 N.E.2d at 116-17. The court delved further into the less intrusive
nature of the Collective Bargaining Act:
Under the conciliation statute before us today, the municipality retains considerably
more authority. With regard to wages, as well as other questions, the municipality
may negotiate an appropriate settlement with safety forces employees. It is only when
negotiations break down completely that the conciliator steps in, and even then the
options from which the conciliator must choose are controlled to a large extent by the
municipality.
Id. at 117. The holding of Pension Fund was considered "doubly persuasive" when applied to
Rocky River IV. Id.
941d. at 117 (citing the City of Rocky River's reply brief). The dissent in Rocky River IV
criticizes the use of Pension Fund given the opinion's "absen[ce of] rules, facts or rationale[,]"
it does not go any further in its analysis of the applicability of Pension Fund. Id at 132
(Wright, J., dissenting).
951d. at 118. The court found it persuasive that the justices of the Pension Fund court
found unanimously that the employee welfare provision was applicable. Id
96Rocky River IV, 539 N.E.2d at 118.
971d. at 120. City of Twinsburg v. State Employment Relations Board, 530 N.E.2d 26
(Ohio 1988), which relied on Rocky River I in holding that the mandatory binding arbitration
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4. Political Considerations
Politically, the Rocky River IV opinion was described as a "disappointing, poorly
reasoned opinion ... that marked the loss of value to the court's use of precedent."98
In a retrospective of the Collective Bargaining Law, it was noted that, "[i]t may be
too harsh to place the court on a pedestal and expect its elected members to ignore
election results."99 However, "in [Rocky River IV], the core of the supreme court
precedent for the future of Ohio was the election returns."'' 0 The mayor of Rocky
River at the time, Earl Martin, took the Supreme Court of Ohio to task for its reversal
and deterioration of home rule. "You've got four people on the Supreme Court that
are backed by the unions and three that are not .... We've got the best Supreme
Court that money can buy."''
The Collective Bargaining Act at the time of the Rocky River decisions was
called "one of the most pro-labor public employee bargaining statutes in the
nation."'0 2 Justice Douglas, who is now the Executive Director of the Ohio Civil
Service Employees Association,0 3 accused the Rocky River I majority, and the
justices in the majority of other public employment cases, of "public-employee
bashing."' 4 He added, "What some members of the majority [in Jones v. Franklin
County SherifJ] have against public employees in general-and police officers and
fire fighters in particular-is difficult to understand."'0 5
provisions of the Collective Bargaining Act are unconstitutional, was also vacated. Rocky
River IV, 539 N.E.2d at 120.






'Rocky River Mayor Raps Return to Arbitration, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), May 11,
1989, at A13. "[The Justices] have taken the control of the local budgets away from the
councils. . . . Every councilman in the state of Ohio has lost 85% of his authority." Id
(internal quotation marks omitted).
In 1991, local newspapers reported that Justices Robie-Resnick, Douglas, Sweeney and
Brown, the same four justices that sided with the unions in overturning Rocky River I, voted to
reconsider Episcopal Retirement Homes v. The Ohio Industrial Relations Commission, 575
N.E.2d 134 (Ohio 1991), weeks after the president of the Ohio AFL-CIO gave $200,000 in
campaign contributions and wrote a letter to the justices expressing his dismay at their original
decision. Associated Press, Justices Deny Letter Influenced Decision, PLAIN DEALER
(Cleveland), Oct. 15, 1991, at 3C. Hodges, the president of the AFL-CIO, said the letter
relating to "the Episcopal case was one of six he wrote to the court and complained about."
Id. Of the six cases, three were reversed. Id. Hodges disclaimed the possibility that his union
actually possessed that type of clout suggested by the article. Id.
10 2Rebecca Hanner White, Robert E. Kaplan & Michael W. Hawkins, Ohio's Public
Employee Bargaining Law: Can it Withstand Constitutional Challenge?, 53 U. CIN. L. REV. 1,
1 (1984) (quoting J. LEWIS & S. SPIRN, OHIO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING LAW 3 (1983)).
103Douglas, supra note 61, at 9.
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IV. THE HOLDING IN ROCKYRIVER IV SHOULD BE DISCARDED WHEN CONSIDERING
THE STATE'S PROHIBITION OF RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS
The Supreme Court of Ohio should more narrowly construe, if not overturn,
Rocky River IV. The Rocky River IV decision reads the employee welfare provision
too broadly in terms of what can be interpreted as a law passed for the general
welfare of all employees. Additionally, to a lesser extent, the Supreme Court of
Ohio should reconsider its view on the relationship between the employee welfare
and home rule provisions.
A. "Employee Welfare" Warrants a Narrower Interpretation
When the Supreme Court of Ohio construed the employee welfare provision
broadly in Rocky River IV, it did so without true consideration for the framers of the
Ohio Constitution and decades of case law. A closer look at both shows that Rocky
River IV is far too broad, and given new definition, the state's ban on residency
requirements will not enjoy automatic supremacy over municipal residency
requirements enacted pursuant to home rule.
1. Intent of the Framers of the Ohio Constitution
The transcript of the proceedings of the 1912 Ohio Constitutional Convention,
the state's most recent, is indicative of the controversy surrounding what was then
known as Proposal 122, the employee welfare provision.
Despite the words of the proposal indicating that the Ohio General Assembly
could pass laws for the welfare of all employees and that it could not be impaired by
any other provision of the constitution, the speakers focused their comments solely
on minimum wage. After the second reading of Proposal 122, one speaker identified
as Mr. Farrell said, "[s]ince this proposal has been on the calendar I have heard some
little objection to it, especially with reference to the clause which would permit the
legislature to pass minimum wage legislation, and to that clause I intend to direct my
remarks exclusively."' 6 Another speaker indicated that, "the kernel of this proposal
is a minimum wage."'0 7
The title of Proposal 122 is indicative of the type of employee conditions the
framers were trying to reach, "Relative to employment of women, children and
persons engaged in hazardous employment."'0 8 One speaker indicated that women
performing sweatshop work "perforce of necessity and of their situation and
environment are compelled to labor for wages far below what is necessary to give
them a decent living, and in many instances far below what the trades can well afford
to pay."' 9 Mr. Dwyer, a judge from Montgomery County,"0 pleaded:
1062 PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF




8 d. at 106.
1°91d. at 1332.
" 10City of Rocky River v. State Employment Relations Bd. (Rocky River IV), 539 N.E.2d
103, 115 (Ohio 1989).
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[G]ive your employees fair living wages, good sanitary surroundings
during hours of labor, protection as far as possible against danger, a fair
working day. Make his life as pleasant for him as you can consistent with
his employment. We want no paupers among those willing to work. Their
wages should be sufficient for them to live in reasonable comfort, to raise
their children on nourishing food to build up their bodies, to procure
sufficiently comfortable clothing for them in attending school, and to
make provision for times of sickness and old age."'
Before and after Mr. Dwyer made this broad, impassioned statement, his
comments regarded minimum wage protections solely."2
Prohibiting residency requirements does not fall under Mr. Dwyer's illustration
of the framer's intent. While the framers sought to promote the general welfare of
"women, children and persons engaged in hazardous employment" through
minimum wage, safety, and hour regulations, it only intended to do so "during hours
of labor" and "consistent with his employment.""' 3 The framers did not intend to
regulate twenty-four hours of an employee's day, but rather it intended the employee
welfare provision give the legislature a tool to regulate the harsh, sweatshop working
conditions apparent at the time. These conditions only existed during the hours of
labor. As discussed later in this section, a residency requirement, on the other hand,
is merely a conditionfor employment, as opposed to a condition of employment, and
thus falls outside of the scope of the working day and cannot be considered under the
employee welfare provision.
2. Narrowing the Scope of the Employee Welfare Provision
The first two clauses of the employee welfare provision permit the Ohio General
Assembly to pass laws "fixing and regulating the hours of labor" and "establishing a
minimum wage.""' 4 Because these clauses are not ambiguous," 5 nor do they create
any confusion as to the subject of a potential law that may be passed under them, this
portion of the employee welfare provision requires no further analysis, and the
"'PROCEEDINGS, Vol. 2, supra note 106, at 1332-33 (emphasis added).
"
2See PROCEEDINGS, vol. 2, supra note 106, at 1332-33. Only Mr. Dwyer addressed
other ways the provision could be used to benefit employees, beyond a minimum wage and
hours of employment. Though others sought to root out sweatshop work, they did not directly
acknowledge the working conditions the employee welfare provision could have improved.
See id at 1332.
113, PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF
OHIO 106 (1912) [hereinafter PROCEEDINGS, vol. 1].
114OHIO CONST. art. II, § 34.
"
5Justice Wright, the main dissenter in Rocky River IV, may disagree. Though he
acknowledges that a minimum wage may be enacted, he believes that the authority to enact the
minimum wage is the only unambiguous part of the employee welfare provision. Rocky River
IV, 539 N.E.2d at 125 (Wright, J., dissenting). It is the only part of the provision for which he
would not examine the original intent. Id. ("I would agree that the language on [minimum
wage] is unambiguous, and resort to the debates thereon would shed no further light on the
question.").
[Vol. 56:71
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holding in Rocky River IV, as far as it pertains to these two clauses, should not be
disturbed.
The court in Rocky River IV, however, misinterpreted the third clause of the
employee welfare provision, which permits the Ohio General Assembly to pass laws
"providing for the comfort, health, safety and general welfare of all
employes .... .""6 Three distinct parts of this clause merit further analysis, all of
which are varyingly important when it comes to determining whether the state's
prohibition of residency requirements was properly enacted under the employee
welfare provision: "general welfare," "all," and "employees."
a. Prohibiting Residency Requirements Is Not for the "General Welfare"
Though the Rocky River IV majority determined that the entire employee welfare
provision was unambiguous and no examination of the original intent of the
provision was warranted, the court failed to acknowledge the ambiguity of the phrase
"general welfare," which is not defined in the Ohio Constitution or by other court
cases."' 7 One of the court's main reasons for expanding the scope of the employee
welfare provision in Rocky River IV relies on the rejection of the city of Rocky
River's argument that the provision only applied to legislation setting a minimum
wage." 8 Regarding the scope of employee welfare, the majority took pains to
examine the Proceedings of the Constitution Convention to support its position that
the employee welfare provision applied to more than minimum wage, but discarded
the Proceedings completely when it came to determining what was meant by
"general welfare.""' 9 The majority was led to the improper conclusion that, "because
a minimum wage was not the only issue included in Proposal No. 122 then any issue,
even remotely connected with employee welfare, should be included.' 2' The court's
absent analysis on the issue leads one to believe that the majority is advocating the
position that because the employee welfare provision is not limited to minimum
wage, it is not limited at all.' 2'
Not limiting the scope of the phrase "general welfare" renders superfluous most
of the employee welfare provision. 22 It negates the need for the words "minimum
wage," "hours of labor," and "safety." If the court interprets the employee welfare
provision to cover any issues "remotely connected with employee welfare," Justice
"
6OHIo CONST. art. II, § 34.
l7 Only where the language of a constitutional provision is unambiguous should a court
look to secondary sources for guidance. Rocky River IV, 539 N.E.2d at 115-16 (citing
Bernardini v. Bd. of Educ., 387 N.E.2d 1222 (Ohio 1979)).
'"Id. at 114-15.
"
9See id. at 114-16.
01d. at 125 (Wright, J., dissenting).
'
21See id.
122See Rocky River IV, 539 N.E.2d at 126 n.35 (Wright, J., dissenting). Though "[t]he
majority is correct in noting that if [the employee welfare provision] applied only to minimum
wage legislation the balance of the provision would be 'mere surplusage[,]"' Justice Wright
wonders "whether the majority's extremely broad interpretation of 'general welfare' does not
have a similar effect." Id.
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Wright argued that the employee welfare provision has lost its meaning.'23 In City of
Lima v. State, the first appellate decision to come down on the constitutionality of
the state's prohibition of residency requirements, the court pointed out that if
"employee welfare" is considered too broadly, no topic pertaining to employees
would ever exceed the scope the provision.'24
Another appellate court hearing a residency case appropriately narrowed the
scope of "general welfare." In January 2008, the Ninth District Court of Appeals in
State v. City ofAkron concluded that despite the fact that, "the term 'general welfare'
is so broad and vague that it provides no ascertainable limit on the scope of the
General Assembly's authority under [the employee welfare provision]' 5 and that no
Supreme Court of Ohio ruling had previously limited its scope,' 26 it remained proper
in this instance to impose limits. 2 7 Indicating that the Supreme Court of Ohio had
no reason in the past to limit the scope of "general welfare," the Akron court
distinguished the Collective Bargaining Act at issue in Rocky River IV, the retirement
program in Pension Fund, and the professor workload standards in American
Association of University Professors v. Central State University28 ("AA UP").'2 9
First, the court found that Rocky River IV was distinguishable from residency
cases because unlike the ban on residency requirements, the Collective Bargaining
Act was comprehensive in nature and "did not purport to create ... rights that did
not previously exist, but instead defined the scope of existing rights and obligations
of public employees and employers."' 30 Second, the court held that the holding in
Pension Fund was not apt precedent because unlike residency requirements, the law
at issue in Pension Fund was a "comprehensive scheme that included over 100
separate provisions and encompassed an entire chapter of the Ohio Revised Code."''
Finally, the Ninth District Court of Appeals pointed to the most recent Supreme
Court of Ohio decision regarding the employee welfare provision, AAUP, which
"'Id. at 126.
124City of Lima v. State, 3d Dist. No. 1-07-21, 2007-Ohio-6419, 48. The crux of the
Lima opinion, however, was whether a residency requirement is part of the work environment.
Id.
125State v. City of Akron, 9th Dist. No. 23660, 2008-Ohio-38, 17 (citing The Legitimate
Objectives of Zoning, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1443, 1445 (1978)).
'
61d. 20. "Although the [Supreme Court of Ohio] has not explicitly articulated a
limitation on the General Assembly's authority under [the employee welfare provision] to
enact legislation for the 'general welfare' of employees, it has been unnecessary for it to do so
in the prior cases before it." Id.
127Id. 19.
12717 N.E.2d 286 (Ohio 1999).
129Akron, 2008-Ohio-38, 7 21-29.
'1Id. 21. "[The Collective Bargaining Act] includes comprehensive provisions that
apply to public collective bargaining units throughout the state, define the scope of collective
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permitted laws that burden employees,12 and said it was distinguishable as well. The
Akron court noted that the holding in AAUP focused on "public interest, not
necessarily benefit to the employees,"'33 while the ban on residency requirements
"does not address any significant social issues impacting the public at large[,] ... is
not part of a comprehensive legislative scheme, [only] deals with a single issue[,]
and [only] applies to a relatively small segment of the population .... ""'
Though not at issue in Rocky River IV, whether a law passed for the "general
welfare" of employees under the employee welfare provision must be for the
"general welfare" at all should be called into question. Though the Supreme Court of
Ohio had declared an employer intentional tort statute unconstitutional because, in
part, it was not passed for the benefit of employees, 3 ' the court declined to use that
same reasoning in AA UP. Instead, the court ruled that a state statute which ended
college professors' collective bargaining power regarding faculty workload was
properly enacted under the employee welfare provision despite the fact that the law
did not benefit employees.'36 Though the court correctly indicated that the employee
welfare provision does not limit the legislature to only passing laws for the benefit of
employees, the court improperly reached the conclusion that laws passed to the
detriment of employees are protected from the effects of other constitutional
provisions. In doing so, the court confused the issue of whether the provision was
one of grant or limitation with the issue of whether the provision allowed great
protection of legislation that hinders employees.'37
132Am. Ass'n of Univ. Professors v. Cent. State Univ. (AAUP), 717 N.E.2d 286 (Ohio
1999).
'
33Akron, 2008-Ohio-38, 23. For further discussion of AAUP and arguments why
legislation passed to the detriment of employees should not fall under the employee welfare
provision, see infra note 137 and accompanying text.
134Akron, 2008-Ohio-38, 24. Further, the residency requirement ban "does not pertain
to the protection or regulation of any existing right or obligation of the affected employees.
Instead, it is an attempt to circumvent municipal home rule authority and reinstate a 'right'
that the employees voluntarily surrendered when they accepted government employment." Id.
The court indicates that this law only affects "those who are employed by political
subdivisions, are subject to residency requirements, and would choose to live elsewhere if
allowed to do so[.]" Id. An alternative view, however, taken by the Cleveland firefighter's
union, suggests that the reach of residency requirements extends to the families of city
employees. Brief of Amicus Curiae OAPFF in Support of Appellees at 10, City of Cleveland
v. State, Nos. 89486, 89565, 2008-Ohio-2655 (Ohio Ct. App.-8th June 20, 2007). For
example, "Employees may want to live near other family members who reside outside
Cleveland. Those other family members may be disabled or elderly who need care or
attention. Those employees could provide that care or attention, except for the fact that the
Cleveland ordinance requires they live in Cleveland." Id. Further, an employee "may be
deprived of the opportunity to send his/her child to a school better suited for the needs of that
child." Id. at 11.
135Johnson v. BP Chems., 707 N.E.2d 1107 (Ohio 1999).
'
36AAUP, 717 N.E.2d at 292-93.
137See id. at 292. The proper result, however, could have been reached much more
simply: State legislatures have plenary power and are only limited in the types of laws it may
pass by its constitution. DANIEL R. MANDELKER ET AL., STATE AND LOCAL GoVERNMENT IN A
FEDERAL SYSTEM 4-6 (6th ed. 2006). Since the employee welfare provision does not indicate
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The court's determination that those detrimental laws enjoy the same protection
was reached without considering why this type of law should enjoy protection of the
employee welfare provision's supremacy clause.138 The AAUP court lists various
laws to the detriment of employees, such as those requiring training programs and
background checks, and indicated that "there can be no question that they constitute
important legislation that the [Ohio] General Assembly has the constitutional
authority to enact."' 39  Although some laws, such as those listed in AAUP, are
important regulations, the plain meaning of the provision and the intent of the
Constitution's framers indicate that those "detrimental" laws may be passed. The
laws cannot, however, enjoy status under the employee welfare provision and should
be subject to a municipality's exercise of authority under home rule, as well as
impairment by other constitutional provisions.40
b. The Ban on Residency Requirements Does Not Pertain to "All" Employees
The Rocky River IV opinion erred when it upheld a law only directed at city
employees rather than "all" employees. When considering the prevailing wage law's
effect on city employees, the Rocky River 1V court did not consider this issue at all. 4'
As the employee welfare provision is currently written, a law entered into under it
should be for "all" employees 42 and interpreted that way.
In examining the types of laws unambiguously entered into under the employee
welfare provision (i.e., minimum wage and hours), it is apparent that it would be
inappropriate to have different general welfare laws for different sectors or different
groups of people. For example, imagine a minimum wage that is different among
the various sectors, or a maternity leave law that distinguished between office
workers and factory workers. While each sector may have its various needs and may
require different legislation, each law must still apply to "all employees" to enjoy
protection under the employee welfare provision's supremacy clause.
that laws to the detriment of employees shall not be passed-but rather says that beneficial
laws may be passed-the legislature has not been divested of its power. AA UP should have
ruled that laws benefiting employees enjoy the protection of the supremacy clause while law
passed to the detriment of employees do not. However, the Third and Ninth District Courts of
Appeals, in striking down the state law forbidding residency requirements, embraced AA UP
and used the case to argue that the employee welfare provision is more about public interest
than employee interest. City of Lima v. State, 3d Dist. No. 1-07-21, 2007-Ohio-6419, 1 52-
53; Akron, 2008-Ohio-38, 24.
3
'See AAUP, 717 N.E.2d 286, 292 (Ohio 1999).
1391d.
14'Though arguing that it is permissible for laws entered into under the employee welfare
provision to be protection from the powers of other constitutional provisions may seem
counterproductive to the arguments of this note, it is used merely to illustrate the inconsistent,
overly broad manner in which Ohio courts have interpreted the meaning of "general welfare of
employees."
14'See City of Rocky River v. State Employment Relations Bd. (Rocky River IV), 539
N.E.2d 103 (Ohio 1989).
142See OHIO CONST. art. II, § 34.
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The state's prohibition of residency requirements only affects full-time
employees of political subdivisions, not all employees of the state of Ohio,'43 and
should not be considered a proper enactment under the employee welfare provision.
The Ohio General Assembly acknowledged that this might become an issue when it
noted in its final analysis of S.B. 82 that "[w]ithout a court interpretation, it is
difficult to say whether this section would apply to the act's prohibition, despite the
General Assembly's recognition of it, where the subject of the state law is not all
employees, but instead only certain government employees."'" Though not
acknowledged under Ohio's current case law, this should be fatal to the Ohio
General Assembly's hopes of prohibiting residency requirements.
c. Residency Does Not Affect "Employees" in the Scope of Their Employment
Finally, the word "employees" is undefined in the Ohio Constitution and is
ambiguous because it may simply refer to an employee acting within the scope of his
or her employment, or it may broadly refer to anyone who has the status of an
employee. If "employee" refers to someone within the scope of employment, this
interpretation would diminish the effects of ambiguity of the term and permit a court
to acknowledge that residency requirements are conditions for employment (i.e.,
outside of the scope of the working day), while wages, hours and safety are
conditions of employment (i.e., pertaining to the employee's work environment).'45
Certain areas of law, such as tort law, draw a distinction between the two
potential interpretations of "employee." For example, an employer is liable for torts
committed by an employee, but only where that employee was acting within the
scope of his or her employment when it was committed.'46 "Consequently," the
143OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 9.481 (LexisNexis 2008).
144FINAL ANALYSIS, S. 82, 126th Gen. Assembly (Ohio 2006). Also, as argued by the city
of Cleveland in its Merit Brief, not only does the fact that the prohibition on residency
requirements applies only insofar as Cleveland's residency requirement pertains to full-time
employees violate the language of the employee welfare provision, but it also violates the
uniformity clause of the Ohio Constitution. Appellants' Merit Brief at 28-33, City of
Cleveland v. State, Nos. 89486, 89565, 2008-Ohio-2655 (Ohio Ct. App.-8th May 22, 2007).
The uniformity clause requires that "[a]ll laws, of a general nature, shall have a uniform
operation throughout the state .... " OHIO CONST. art II, § 26. Arguably, however, any laws
entered into under the employee welfare provision, given its supremacy over other parts of the
constitution, may not be subject to the uniformity clause. See discussion infra Part IV.B.2. If
the Ohio General Assembly did not have to adhere to the uniformity clause when considering
employee welfare legislation, it could enact legislation targeting certain counties or
municipalities while intentionally excluding others.
145See City of Lima v. State, 3d Dist. No. 1-07-21, 2007-Ohio-6419, 28-31. This was
the bulk of the city of Lima's argument, which was ultimately successful. Id. To further
illustrate the distinction, the Lima court wrote, "[D]oes the term 'employees' refer to the status
of being an employee [twenty four] hours per day, which attaches at hiring and sheds at firing
.... or does the term have a more limited meaning, which is [intrinsically] tied to a particular
locus; here, the work environment[.]" Id 28.
146This is the doctrine of respondeat superior, under which "an employer or principal [is]
liable for the employee's or agent's wrongful acts committed within the scope of the
employment or agency." Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004). See also Lima, 2007-Ohio-
6419, T 29 (citing Byrd v. Faber, 565 N.E.2d 584 (Ohio 1991)). The Supreme Court of Ohio
recognized this distinction when it indicated that "an employer's intentional tort against his
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Lima court noted, "the law recognizes that one may be an 'employee' in status, but
not by conduct. Since other areas of the law draw this distinction, the scope of the
term 'employees' in [the employee welfare provision] should be considered."' 47
The phrase "general welfare" is also ambiguous, yet, once properly interpreted,
will be instructive in determining which interpretation of "employees" is appropriate.
When the meaning of a word or a phrase is unclear, 48 various rules of statutory
construction may be used to determine the proper interpretation. The doctrine of
noscitur a sociis 149 instructs the court to limit the meaning of general words by the
more specific words surrounding it. 50 The Lima court thoroughly applied this test.
By addressing the scope of the clause "comfort, safety, health and general welfare of
all employees" in relation to the other clauses, the Lima court determined the hours
and minimum wage clauses "address working terms and conditions within the
working environment context . . . ."" The court distinguished those clauses by
noting that "they do not address qualifications for employment nor do they address
issues outside of the working environment."' 52 In applying noscitur a sociis, the
court determined that "general welfare" should, likewise, be interpreted to only
address working environment conditions.'53
Next, the Lima court addressed the phrase "general welfare" in relation to the
other terms in the clause, "comfort," "health," and "safety," and indicated that
"common sense dictates that [these] words . . . relate to working environment
employee is not an act which takes place within the employment relationship." Brady v.
Safety-Kleem Corp., 576 N.E.2d 722, 732-33 (Ohio 1991) (Brown, J., concurring) (citing
Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron Chems., 433 N.E.3d 572, 576 (Ohio 1982)). Therefore,
the employee welfare provision "does not apply to employer intentional torts because they are
not part of the employment relationship." Id. at 733.
147Lima, 2007-Ohio-6419, 29.
148The Lima court determined that the term "employees" was ambiguous after turning to
dictionaries. Id. One dictionary defined "employee" as "[a] person who works in the service
of another person (the employer) under an express or implied contract [for] hire, under which
the employer has the right to control the details of work performance." Id. 30 (citing
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 564 (8th ed. 2004)). The other defined an "employee" as "[a]
person who works for another in return for financial or other compensation." Id. (citing
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 250 (2d College ed. 1985)). Though both dictionaries
acknowledge the status of being an employee, the Lima court noted that Black's "also
emphasizes employer control over work performance, which generally applies when an
employee is acting within the scope of his or her employment." Lima, 2007-Ohio-6419, 30.




51Lima, 2007-Ohio-6419, 34. The Eighth District closely followed the reasoning and
holding of Lima in deciding Cleveland's residency appeal. City of Cleveland v. State, 8th
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conditions."'54 As a result, "the doctrine of noscitur a sociis applied to the general
welfare clause as a whole and to its components supports Lima's argument that the
clause grants legislative authority for the purpose of passing laws that affect the
employees' working environment [conditions]."' 55
If the Supreme Court of Ohio holds that a residency requirement is outside of the
scope of the working environment, the court would next have to determine whether a
residency requirement violates the employee's "inalienable and fundamental right of
an individual to choose where to live pursuant to Section I of Article I, Ohio
Constitution."' 56 However, as the Ninth District Court of Appeals noted in City of
Akron v. State, "citizens do not have a right to live where they want and demand
employment with a particular employer," despite Section I of Article I of the Ohio
Constitution.'57
The employee welfare provision, as written, supports reading "general welfare,"
"all," and "employees" as strictly as suggested here, but no Ohio courts have
interpreted it to require these characteristics of employee welfare laws. If the
Supreme Court of Ohio adopts these suggestions and narrowly construes the
employee welfare provision, the ban on residency requirements would not enjoy
protection under the supremacy clause and would be impaired by a city law properly
enacted pursuant to home rule. If, however, Ohio courts continue to interpret
broadly the employee welfare provision, examination of the supremacy clause is
warranted.
'"
41d. 35. Though this argument lends favorably to, at the very least, a narrowing of the
holding of Rocky River IV, resting the legal argument on "common sense" is difficult to attack,
much less defend.
1551d. 36 (emphasis added). The Akron court applied the rule of construction that the
employee welfare provision "should not be interpreted in a manner that would yield an absurd
result." State v. City of Akron, 9th Dist. No. 23660, 2008-Ohio-38, 28 (citing Mishr v.
Poland Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 667 N.E.2d 365, 366 (Ohio 1996)). The opinion said,
To construe the legislative authority under [the employee welfare provision] to pass
laws providing for the "general welfare" of employees to be so broad as to encompass
a law that reinstates a right that employees voluntarily surrendered upon accepted
employment would yield an absurd result, and could potentially gives limitless power
to the General Assembly to undermine all home rule authority of municipalities to
make decisions about their employees.
Id.
156See Cleveland v. State, No. 06-CV-590414, slip op. at 4 (C.P. Cuyahoga Feb. 23,
2007). The constitutional provision indicates that "[a]ll men are, by nature, free and
independent, and have certain inalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and
defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and seeking and
obtaining happiness and safety." OHIO CONST. art. I, § 1.
157City of Lima v. State, 3d Dist. No. 1-07-21, 2007-Ohio-6419, 75 (citing Smeltzer v.
Smeltzer, No. 92-C-50, 2007 WL 424828, at *1 (7th Cir. Nov. 24, 1993)). When deciding
whether to uphold a residency requirement in the city of Akron, Ohio, the Ohio Ninth District
Court of Appeals noted that "Akron city employees surrendered any 'right' that they once had
to choose where to live when they agreed to become employees of the city of Akron, just as
they may have agreed to other limitations on their personal freedoms, such as their freedoms
to dress, groom themselves, or behave as they choose." Akron, 2008-Ohio-38, 27.
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B. Limiting the Employee Welfare Provision's Supremacy Clause
The Rocky River IV court's ruling that laws enacted under the employee welfare
provision could not be impaired by local laws enacted under home rule ignored the
spirit of the framers of the Ohio Constitution and prevailing precedent. This ruling
merits overturning.
1. The Threat of Lochner Era Challenges Has Passed
At the time the framers of the Ohio Constitution met to discuss the scope the
employee welfare provision, state laws seeking to protect employees were regularly
struck down as unconstitutional under the U.S. Constitution.'5 8 Pursuant to the
employees' constitutional right to contract under the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment,"5 9 the U.S. Supreme Court struck down a state's regulation
of the working hours of bakers in Lochner v. New York.' 60 In Lochner, the state of
New York argued that it should be able to pass any legislation "which may be
said.., to make people healthy." The Court, however, dismissed this argument,
indicating that the law would have only been valid if there were "some fair ground,
reasonable in and of itself, to say that there is material danger to the public health or
to the health of the employees, if the hours of labor are not curtailed.' 6' The ruling
in Lochner came down in 1905, only seven years before Ohio's Constitutional
Convention in 1912.161 In the so-called "Lochner era," various other state workplace
regulations were being struck down on constitutional grounds, such as a protection of
the right for unions to strike,'63 restraints on business entry,"6 and minimum wages
for women. 6 '
There is little in the Proceedings of the 1912 Constitution that indicate why the
framers decided that no other provision of the Ohio Constitution could impair the
employee welfare provision, but there is little doubt that the holding in Lochner
weighed heavily on their minds."6 In the only comment in the transcript of the
Convention pertaining to the supremacy clause of the employee welfare provision,
Mr. Dwyer touched on the Lochner case and the right to contract: "[The courts] are
changing very much to be in accord with public sentiment ... and we should put a
158See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
1591n pertinent part, the Fourteenth Amendment says, "[N]or shall any state deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
'6°198 U.S. 45, 57 (1905) ("There is no reasonable ground for interfering with the liberty
of person or the right of free contract, by determining the hours of labor, in the occupation of a
baker.").
16'Id. at 60, 61.
162See id. at 45; PROCEEDINGS, vol. 2, supra note 106.
163Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
164New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932).
165Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
166See City of Rocky River v. State Employment Relations Bd. (Rocky River IV), 539
N.E.2d 103, 125 (Ohio 1989) (Wright, ., dissenting).
[Vol. 56:71
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clause in the constitution that will give the courts an opportunity to more liberally
construe these matters than they have done in the past. '167 Justice Wright, in his
Rocky IV dissent notes that "[a] careful review of the [proceedings] reveals that the
only purpose for the language that the majority now discovers is all powerful and
completely subsumes the whole of the Constitution was to protect men, women and
children from the powerful proscription against [the] interference with one's right to
contract." 68
Considering that Lochner era cases were striking down state minimum wage,
hour, and safety regulations (the only subjects directly discussed in the Proceedings),
the reason for the supremacy clause becomes clear. However, the "proscription
against [the] interference with one's right to contract" disappeared in the 1930s, with
the end of the Lochner era.' 69 Since then, the concern over whether the employee
welfare provision would be struck down on federal constitutional grounds was over
and arguably rendered moot the purpose of its supremacy clause.
Despite the end of the Lochner era fifty years earlier, the court in Rocky River IV
improperly continued to assert the dominance of the employee welfare provision
over the home rule provision when it held that municipalities could not enact laws
pursuant to home rule that impaired the Collective Bargaining Act. 70 Since the
framers only intended the employee welfare provision to regulate minimum wages,
hours, and safety, and as such, only intended to protect them from Lochner-era
challenges, the Supreme Court of Ohio should reconsider its holding in Rocky River
IV and the relationship between the employee welfare provision and home rule.
2. Rocky River IV Improperly Relied on Pension Fund
Beyond the scope of the framer's intent, the Rocky River IV majority relied on
State ex rel. Board of Trustees of Police & Fireman's Pension Fund v. Board of
Trustees of Police Relief (Pension Fund),171 which held that the employee welfare
provision could not be impaired by home rule, to justify the employee welfare
provision's supremacy.'72 The use of Pension Fund as binding precedent was
integral to the court's rationale, but it was controversial since the Pension Fund
decision appeared to be a legal "aberration"; it strongly departed from precedent
establishing that home rule laws may impair employee welfare laws and was nearly
ignored for the twenty-two years between the time it was decided and the court's
opinion in Rocky River IV.
173
167PROCEEDINGS, vol. 2, supra note 106, at 1335.
'
68Rocky River IV, 539 N.E.2d at 125 (Wright, J., dissenting).
169See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) (upholding a state statute setting the
minimum price for the sale of milk); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937)
(upholding a state minimum wage law for women).
'
7
°Rocky River IV, 539 N.E.2d at 125 (Wright, J., dissenting).
"'1233 N.E.2d 135 (Ohio 1967).
1721d
173Not one Supreme Court of Ohio majority opinion cited Pension Fund before the Rocky
River cases. However, one concurring opinion written by Justice Douglas in City of Kettering
v. State Employment Relations Board, 496 N.E.2d 983, 990 (Ohio 1986), cited Pension Fund
favorably between 1967 and 1988.
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Between Pension Fund in 1967 and Rocky River IV in 1989, a string of Supreme
Court of Ohio cases involving both home rule and the employee welfare provisions
focused on performing home rule analysis and ignored the supremacy clause in the
employee welfare provision. 74 Justice Wright's dissent in Rocky River IV addressed
this pattern, noting that Rocky River IV was "the first time a majority of [the] court
ever 'discovered' the awesome scope of [the employee welfare provision], save the
one solitary pronouncement in [Pension Fund].' 75
The court's reliance on Pension Fund for broad constitutional analysis is also
problematic because of Pension Fund's short, yet sweeping, opinion. The opinion
"contains no constitutional history, ignores the ramifications of its language, and...
reaches its conclusion absent rules, facts or rationale."' 76 This made the fact that the
majority in Rocky River IV "indicated without equivocation that [the employee
welfare provision] overrides all other provisions of the Ohio Constitution" all the
more tenuous."' Further, "the majority has reached the incredible result that any
legislation passed for the stated purpose of promoting the 'general welfare of all
employees' may render any other specific provision of the Constitution null and
void."' 78
Practically speaking, it is difficult to envision that one small provision of the
entire Ohio Constitution is held supreme above all others. Justice Wright, whose
dissenting opinion in Rocky River IV is highly instructive on this issue, expressed his
disbelief that "the delegates to the 1912 Constitutional Convention intended to, in
effect, discard all other provisions of the Ohio Constitution, giving the General
Assembly carte blanche to legislate changes in our Constitution without the
bothersome process of submitting these matters to a vote of the people."'79 Justice
Wright combed the Ohio Constitution for various provisions potentially subject to
the employee welfare provision and illustrates their importance: freedom and
protection of property,' abolishment of government, 8' trial by jury,'82 free speech
'
74See Rocky River IV, 539 N.E.2d at 113 (citing Cleveland ex rel. Neelon v. Locher, 266
N.E.2d 831 (Ohio 1971) (involving the maximum hours for firefighters controlled by city
charter); State ex rel. Evans v. Moore, 431 N.E.2d 311 (Ohio 1982) (involving a state
prevailing wage law); State Pers. Bd. of Review v. Bay Village Civil Serv. Comm'n, 503
N.E.2d 518, 519 (Ohio 1986) (involving the "investigative and removal authority" over city
civil service commissioners)).
175Rocky River IV, 539 N.E.2d at 122 (Wright, J. dissenting). Wright concurred with the
majority in Rocky River I, which held that the Collective Bargaining Act was "unconstitutional
to the extent that it violates a municipality's right to exercise its powers of local self-
government .... " City of Rocky River v. State Employment Relations Bd. (Rocky River 1),
530 N.E.2d 1, 5 (Ohio 1988).
176Rocky River IV, 539 N.E.2d at 132 (Wright, J. dissenting).
'
771d. at 122 (Wright, J., dissenting).
1d. at 125 (Wright, J., dissenting).
1791d. at 122 (Wright, J., dissenting).
180OHIO CONST. art. I, § 1. "All men are, by nature, free and independent, and have
certain inalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty,
acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and seeking and obtaining happiness and
safety." Id.
[Vol. 56:71
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and free press,183 redress in the courts,' and reserving power to the people.'8
Justice Wright continued,
Some might suggest that the basic rights noted above are mere surplusage
as the protections guaranteed by the United States Constitution remain
intact. But, imagine our citizenry's surprise when it discovers that the
legislative three-reading requirement and the rights of a public initiative
and referendum are potentially inoperative. Consider the Governor's
chagrin when he finds that his power of veto and the one-issue mandate
for a special legislative session have been brought into question.
Likewise, interested citizens may be dismayed to find that open sessions
of the General Assembly as mandated by Section 13, Article II of the
Ohio Constitution no longer apply when 'employee welfare' legislation is
under consideration.
86
To interpret the supremacy clause strictly is to undermine every single provision
of the Ohio Constitution when employee welfare is at hand. If the Supreme Court of
Ohio adopts this interpretation when ruling on residency requirements, it will strip
municipalities of their home rule powers to regulate their own communities. Instead,
the court should strongly consider the framer's intent and the draconian effects of the
supremacy clause and overturn Rocky River IV.
V. CONCLUSION
When the Supreme Court of Ohio hears the challenge to the state law prohibiting
residency requirements, the court should take the opportunity to re-examine the non-
textual and results-oriented reading afforded to the employee welfare provision of
the Ohio Constitution and overturn Rocky River IV. In its place, the court should
adopt a reading of the employee welfare provision that would grant great deference
to minimum wage and safety legislation and scrutinize legislation for the "'general
welfare' of 'all' 'employees,"' ensuring that the law is for the benefit of every
employee in the scope of his or her employment.
18 1OHIO CONST. art. I, § 2. In part, "Government is instituted for their equal protection
and benefit, and they have the right to alter, reform, or abolish the same, whenever they may
deem it necessary .... " Id.
"82OHIO CONST. art. I, § 5. "The right of trial by jury shall be inviolate, except that, in
civil cases, laws may be passed to authorize the rendering of a verdict by the concurrence of
not less than three-fourths of the jury." Id.
'
83OHIo CONST. art I, § 11. In part, "[e]very citizen may freely speak, write, and publish
his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of the right; and no law shall be
passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech, or of the press." Id.
184HOIo CONST. art. I, § 16. In part, "All courts shall be open, and every person, for an
injury done him in his land, goods, person, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of
law, and shall have justice administered without denial or delay." Id.
...OHIO CONST. art. I, § 20. "This enumeration of rights shall not be construed to impair
or deny others retained by the people; and all powers, not herein delegated, remain with the
people." Id.
186Rocky River IV, 539 N.E.2d at 123-24 (Wright, J. dissenting).
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This approach would force the court to remove the veil of the employee welfare
provision and its accompanying supremacy clause from the state's prohibition of
residency requirements. A law that attempts to regulate conditions outside of the
scope of the working day, pinpoints legislation only for employees of political
subdivisions, and circumvents the municipality's constitutional powers of home rule
should not be permitted to point to the all-powerful employee welfare provision for
protection from home rule. Without this approach, the Ohio General Assembly has a
powder keg of constitutional authority to enact laws only marginally related to
employee welfare that trump every other protection guaranteed by the Ohio
Constitution.
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